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I. THE MODERN APPROACHES TO CHOICE-OF-LAW DECISIONS
The average judge, when confronted by a problem in the conflict of laws, feels
almost completely lost, and, like a drowning man, will grasp at a straw.
Benjamin Cardozo to Walter Wheeler Cook.'
* Part one of Professor McLaughlin's article appears at 93 W. VA. L. REv. 957 (1991).
** B.A. Ohio State University, 1962; J.D. Ohio State University, 1965; Assistant Professor,
West Virginia University, College of Law, 1968; Professor of Law, 1974 to present.
1. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 ILL. L. REv. 493,
528 (1942). This was of course stated in the hay day of lex loci by a champion of lex loci and vested
rights theory. It is resonant with the verse by Thurman Arnold quoted in note 65 below. Only in
hindsight does the vaunted certainty and clarity of lex loci appear; it is of a piece with "golden eras"
and "the good old days."
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The new approach to choice of law gives little in the way of
straws "to grasp at." That is its beauty: no illusions - the difficult
choice must be made. But if the aim of choice of law is kept firmly
in mind, and if all doctrine is thought of as an approach to analysis
to achieve that aim (and not a formula, rule or other formalistic
litmus test), then a life raft and compass can be found and straws
need not be grasped at. The aim is simple: pick the law that makes
the most sense in the multistate context of the dispute before the
court. The approach to "making sense" of the choice-of-law di-
lemma is more involved, but has a simple foundation: consider the
point of view of all the people (including people as a polity) who
have an interest in the just resolution of the dispute. The various
approaches proposed since the judicial discovery of lex loci's mor-
ibund condition can be synthesized into one approach which is best
exemplified by a functional use of the Second Restatement. 2 The
burden of this article is to defend this assertion.
A. The Approach Within the New Approaches
As is well-known, there are many new approaches to choice of
law. My thesis is that within those approaches there is for the most
part a commonality of purpose and technique sufficient to talk about
a single modern approach. Several of the theories appear to em-
phasize one factor to the total exclusions of others. Some, like the
pure Currie conception of interest analysis, wrongly assess a par-
ticular factor such that it is better to speak of two or three of the
approaches as but phases in the development of the modern ap-
proach, rather than as alternative formulations of the modern ap-
proach. But, for the most part, the approaches actually used by
courts are but various formulations of one basic modern approach.
In arguing that there is only one modern approach, I will first
survey the various formulations in somewhat chronological order;
I will then identify their commonality and then briefly explore the
reasons there seem to be so many approaches or, in other words,
why there are so many formulations of the modern approach. I
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971) [hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT].
[Vol. 94
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss1/4
JUSTICE IN CONFLICTS
attempt to answer this last question by identifying the welter of
available constructs by which to structure an approach. All this is
a prelude to reformulating the modern approach and arguing that
the Second Restatement, if viewed as an approach, not a doctrine,
is the best readily accessible formulation of the Modern Approach.
1. A Survey of Modern Approaches
The first formulary deviation from lex loci was called either
"grouping of contacts," "center of gravity," or both at once.' The
"contacts" apparently were the material elements of the case and
instead of relying only on the last contact as the vested rights theory
demanded, the idea was "to group" elements in their various "loci"
to see which state had the weightier group. Another way of talking
about not relying on the last element in time is to use the metaphor,
"the center of gravity." "Gravity" refers not to seriousness but to
the weighting of each state's contacts to determine the real center
of the cause of action; the metaphor suggests the viewing of the
whole claim as a thing and determining which state the cause of
action "balances" on. Both "grouping" or "centering" suggest a
kind of quantification: Identify discrete contacts; identify each with
a state; count each state's contacts; and the one with the most con-
tacts prevails. This was quickly seen as a new kind of formalism
and one easily manipulated. Moreover, merely identifying and
counting contacts did not well serve even the original purpose of
finding the state "most closely associated" because of the "signif-
icant acts of the parties."
4
The nature and quality of each contact must be evaluated in
order to truly assess association. Identifying and "counting" con-
tacts implies each counts as one, when we know that some are much
more significant than others. Moreover, what counts as a single
countable contact is, to say the least, problematic, a matter of ar-
3. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Ind. 1945), may be the first court to use the
phrase "center of gravity" and apply it citing ELLIOTT CHEATHAM, ET AL., CASES ON CONFLICT OF
LAvs (2nd ed. 1941) and HARPER & TAINTOR, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937). Rubin v. Irving
Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 424, 431 (N.Y. 1953), used the phrase "the most significant contacts with the
matter in dispute." See also Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).
4. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d at 423.
1991]
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bitrary labeling. For example in Haag v. Barnes,5 the court obviously
eager to uphold the paternity child support agreement which was
valid in Illinois and not in New York, lists and numbers four con-
tacts which boil down to the father's being domiciled in Illinois and
the desperate, unwed mother having to go there to get his support
for the birthing of their child. The fact that the "liaison" with the
mother was exclusively in New York where she was domiciled and
that both she and the child to be supported were living in New York
at the time of the law suit were dismissed by Judge Fuld as of "far
less weight and significance" than the numbered Illinois contacts.
The fact that the state of New York had, at trial time and prior to
that, almost exclusive interest in seeing that the child was well pro-
vided for, was ignored by the court.
Actually, the result in Haag makes good sense, but only if both
the expectations of the parties (assuming the parties to be the mother
and father) and an adequate provision for the child are also con-
sidered. Since the dispute is ultimately about adequacy of provision
for the child and settled expectations of the father, it makes sense
to consider them even where the formal issue is the enforceability
of a contract according to its terms, which, again, formally turns
on whether Illinois or New York law applies. Indeed, the court in
Haag does consider expectations as part of its choice-of-law analysis
(as part of the traditional doctrine of party autonomy),6 but does
not fit "expectations" talk with other factors to make one coherent
analysis. Moreover, Judge Fuld does tack on to the end of his opin-
ion explicit notice of the court's opinion that the settlement on the
child ($275 per month in 1962 dollars until age sixteen) was rather
generous (at least by the all-male-clubby standards then prevailing).
Again, he does not explain how this fact of adequate support fits
into the analysis of choice of law. It is more on the order of "oh
by the way, the result here is pretty good too"; although one has
the distinct feeling that this "tail" wagged the "dog."
5. 175 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1961).
6. "Party autonomy" is a doctrine going back to the last century, Pritchard v. Norton, 106
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Extended mention is here made of Haag because it is a classic
case of the court noticing prominently the three factors that deter-
mine what makes sense (polity interest, expectations and judicial
justice) but still talking as if some modified version of vested rights
obtained. "Grouping of contacts" or "center of gravity" is here
called a "modified version of vested rights" because it both pretends
to a rule that is jurisdiction seeking only and focuses on the material
elements of the claim. Since it does not focus on the last material
element alone, it can be called "modified."
The commentators were quick to offer alternative approaches
once a bona-fide judicial breach in lex loci was made. In Babcock
v. Jackson,7 the first pure tort claim to break with lex loci, Judge
Fuld mentions several places the "most significant relationship test"
of the tentative preliminary drafts of the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws. The Second Restatement did not emerge in its
definitive version until 1971. It uses rules, presumptions, and an
analytic standard to find the law with "the most significant rela-
tionship" to the dispute. The test takes into account things other
than the interests of states and, unlike pure (or Currie) interest anal-
ysis discussed below, it focuses for its presumptive rules on the place
of the primary events involved in a legal dispute, somewhat like lex
loci. Because it uses both rules and an analytic approach it has been
called "schizophrenic." 8 Nonetheless, it has gradually caught on and
is becoming the dominant formulation of the modern approach.
However, initially (in the 1960's and 1970's), the most talked
about approach was "interest analysis," especially a version invented
by Brainerd Currie which involved two steps: first, a court must
determine whether there is a "true" conflict, and second, if a true
conflict is found, it must resolve it by some presumptive rule. Cur-
rie's "presumptive rule" was forum preference. 9 Alternatively, the
7. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
8. LEA BRILMAYER & JAmES A. MATIN, CONFLnICT OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS 273 (3d
ed. 1990). See also William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?,
34 MERCER L. REv. 645 (1983).
9. Brainerd Currie (1912-1965) was a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago and later
at Duke University. His seminal article, which was said to have devastated lex loci doctrine, is Married
Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflicts-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958). In a
1991]
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New York Court of Appeals has created a set of rules that amount
to a lex loci delicti presumption in true conflicts cases in torts.10 Or
one could use a "better law" presumption: if two states have a true
interest in having their laws apply, pick the state whose law is some-
how "better," hopefully in some objective way. Alternatively, a
court could eschew the presumptive mode of escape from the di-
lemma and actually attempt to determine which of the two (or more)
interested states has the greater interest, a process which Brainerd
Currie curiously claimed was not in the legitimate province of courts."
A "true conflict" is one in which each of two or more states
has a genuine "interest" in having its law apply to the dispute. What
gives a state a genuine interest in having its law apply is not difficult
if one assumes Currie's definition of "interest." Currie's notion of
interest sees any state law as a product of warring public interests
in which some part of the public won and some part lost. The part
that won got its interest protected, the part that lost did not. The
particular public interest (i.e., an aggregation of private interests)
sought to be protected by the law is the state's interest.
short piece, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 178-
79, he stated:
Foreign law would be applied only when the court has determined that the foreign state
has a legitimate interest in the application of its law and policy to the case at bar and that
the forum has none.
In the same article he declared:
[A]ssessment of the respective values of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign
states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order.
This is a function that should not be committed to courts in a democracy.
Id. at 176, reprinted in B.AsmRD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 177, 182
(1963) and cited in ROGER C. CRAMTON, ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES-COMMENTs-QUEsTIONs 241
(4th ed. 1987). In brief summary, Currie's position was as follows: If the forum and some other
state have a true interest in having their law apply, then, according to Currie, there is no nonarbitrary
or non-political way to decide which state has the greater interest, and therefore the forum should
pick its own law; at least, forum law is familiar. Another way to put it is that in any case there is
a presumption that forum law will apply, and the presumption can be rebutted only by showing that
the forum has no interest in having its law apply and some other state does have an interest. If no
state has an interest, apply forum law. If there are two (or more) interested states but neither is the
forum, the forum should pick the foreign law most like its own.
10. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
11. See supra note 9. I say "curiously" because courts make and are expected to make such
policy judgments as an integral part of their role as judges. Currie's position proscribing interest-
weighing by judges was much criticized. One commentator states it "seems to strike at the heart of
the judicial process." Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and En-
lightened Forum, 49 CAL. L. REv. 845, 853 (1961).
[Vol. 94
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For instance, state A adopts an automobile guest statute. The
guest statute is a product of a contest between those who favor
keeping insurance premiums lower (possibly insurance companies
and host-drivers) and those who favor compensation for automobile
guests when injured by merely neglectful host drivers. The premium-
payer-host drivers (and insurance companies) win the political con-
test. Since it is assumed that politics is power, that is, the aggregate
of private interests that marshalls the more power wins, and that
power in democratic politics is votes and only domiciliaries vote,
then state A is only concerned with domiciliaries who are insurance
premium payers (or insurance companies insuring domiciliaries).
Thus, state A with its guest statute only has an interest if the de-
fendant (the insurance premium payer) is a domiciliary of state A.
The fact that the accident may have happened in state A, or that
the plaintiff lived in state A, would give state A no interest in having
its guest statute apply. State A, as evidenced by its guest statute,
has no "interest" in hurting guest claimants (i.e. in lowering the
standard of driving care with regard to them or of not compensating
them for their injuries); it simply has no interest in helping them
i.e. it is indifferent to guests. The place of the accident is irrelevant
because a guest statute is not a rule of conduct but of liability. By
a parity of reasoning, if state B has no guest statute, then only if
the plaintiff guest is from state B will it have an interest in having
state B law apply.
Currie's version of "interest" has two clear consequences: party
domicile will be of first importance and there will be many false
conflicts. A "false conflict" is one which appeared on superficial
first glance to involve a conflict, but which, after careful "Currie
analysis," had none. 2
Currie's interest analysis has been heavily critiqued and soundly
criticized. 3 The basic problem with his analysis is his very narrow
12. "If the court finds an apparent conflict between the interests of the two states it should
reconsider. A more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of one state or
the other might avoid conflict." CRAMTON, ET AL., supra note 9, at 203 (summarizing Currie).
13. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislature Intent, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 392 (1980); John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own,
23 Wi. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981).
1991]
7
McLaughlin: Conflict of Laws: The New Approach to Choice of Law: Justice in S
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1991
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
notion of what gives a polity an interest in having its legal policy
apply to a private dispute. Private disputes are ordinarily resolved
by common-law principles of the polity. Such common-law prin-
ciples are inferred by the dispute-resolving court either from prior
positive announcement in judicial opinions of the polity, in legis-
lative enactments (as with the Uniform Commercial Code or a guest
statute), or from the less than positive voices of (1) constitutions,
(2) the courts of other polities, (3) its own judicial dicta, (4) legal
commentaries from restatements to law review articles, and (5) per-
suasive reasons as to sound policy and justice contained in lawyers'
briefs, law clerks' summaries, and the deciding judges' own private
musings. I draw this out in some detail here, in part, to emphasize
that knowing what the law of any state is at any particular time is
no easy matter in most cases and on many issues. But I mainly want
to emphasize here the fact that law, especially the law of private
disputes, is not necessarily, and only, private interest promotion
through politics-cum-power.
Every law comes into being on a claim of justice; politics floats
in the rhetoric of justice; the common law is awash in justice. A
proposed guest statute was presented to an enacting legislature not
as a claim by a powerful voting block for lower insurance premiums
or as a claim by wealthy insurance companies as a technique for
greater profitability by lowering the risk of payment, rather it was
presented as an instrument to avoid the injustice of friendly and
probably collusive law suits which unfairly inflate the cost of in-
surance. This argument may have been augmented with a further
claim that it is unjust for a guest to reciprocate for the free ride
by instituting a law suit against the generous host for the host's
neglectful, but unintended, harmful behavior. Or, further, that since
most automobile accidents involve more than one car, as between
guests of the tortfeasor and third parties (in the other car) the third
parties have a more just claim to the limited insurance resource
because, unlike the guest, they had no prior knowledge of the tort-
feasor and, thus, are innocent of the hint of assumption of risk. 4
These are all claims of justice. Claims of justice are always made.
14. Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1965).
[Vol. 94
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They are not mere window dressing. They do not merely make leg-
islators feel better about action taken purely for self-interested rea-
sons. Sure, the hardheaded political realist is right that self interest
does play a large role in legislative and democratic decision-making,
but it is far from the total explanation for majoritarian law, let
alone common law. The ubiquitous rhetoric of justice is real. The
disinterested votes must be persuaded. The ambiguously interested
voter must be courted not alone with statistics about what her true
interest is, but with arguments from fairness. Many numerically un-
derpowered groups win their claims - women winning the right to
vote being the most obvious example.
What does this mean for choice of law? It means that Currie's
interest analysis is badly flawed. If state A enacted its guest statute
because it felt guest lawsuits for mere negligence were unjust, then
it has an interest in having its vision of justice applied to suits where
either the plaintiff or defendant are domiciled in state A and when
either the plaintiff or defendant has had a significant presence in
the state (such as being involved in an accident there, working there,
or suing or being sued there). Moreover, if the reason for the polity's
substantive rule is more than "mere" justice, domicile or presence
of parties may be, depending on the policy, of little importance, no
importance, or dominant importance. The general name given to
such nonjustice reasons for a rule is "policy." These policy or
"instrumentalist" reasons vary from influencing behavior in order
to promote safety and well-being, to finding a ready source of com-
pensation for those suffering catastrophic loss. The facts that give
a state a "policy interest" in applying its law will, of course, be
dependant on the particular policy attributed to the law. A nonguest-
statute state may, for example, have attributed to it the policy of
finding a source of ready compensation for auto accident victims.
Such policy would be, further, readily inferable from a state re-
quirement that all vehicle owners carry liability insurance that in-
cludes passengers. Then an injury in that state, or an injured party
domiciled in that state, will give that state an interest in having its
law apply to resolving a lawsuit involving the injury or the injured
party. The in-state injury gives the state an interest because debts
may occur there to heal the injuries and house the injured. The
injured party domiciled in-state gives an interest to the domicile
1991]
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because of the special concern the domicile has for the long-term
welfare of its own domiciliaries. If the policy is designed to influence
behavior, of course, the state where the offending behavior occurred
will have an interest in having its law apply to influence (mostly
deter) others while in the state.
All those potential interests greatly complicate interest analysis
which started out confidently proclaiming that most apparent con-
flicts, if viewed rightly (i.e., deeply and carefully), were not conflicts
at all. 15 In fact, there was more conflict than Currie ever dreamed
of in his stunted public-law- power-politics view of law. And while
his implicit view of law was accepted by many commentators on
conflicts of laws (if not many judges) another real flaw in interest
analysis was quickly uncovered by judges: the determination in fact
of a state's interest in having its law apply was fraught with difficulty
and uncertainty. Should all plausible purposes (even if only policy
purposes are recognized) for a particular rule be counted as actual
purposes of a polity in its enactment or adoption of the rule or
should only those purposes count that the polity actually consid-
ered? 16 This was the nasty problem which the New York court wres-
tled with soon after Babcock v. Jackson.7 Compounding this problem
of determining purpose is the problem of determining the law of
another polity, especially when the law is found in the other polity's
judicial decisions and not its legislative enactments. This is a problem
always present in choice of law decisions. The tendency has been
to take a legal positivist's approach to cases: to read them as "case
law:" as rules laid down by judges not unlike legislative enactments.
This gives state A's case law precedent a binding effect in state B
when B chooses to use A's law, that A's case precedent would not
have in state A. This distortion of the legal process seemed inherent
15. See supra note 9. For an excellent article that provides a thoughtful critique of Currie's
interest analysis as much too narrow and parochial in its conception of policy, see Note, Comparative
Impairment Reformed: Rethinking State Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 95 HAv. L. REv. 1079
(1982).
16. See, Willis L. M. Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLuM. L. REv. 548
(1971); Max Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 AM. J. Comp. L. 632, 663 (1962) (book
review).
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in the traditional system. The modern approach can minimize this
problem. However, interest analysis, which aims at finding false
conflicts, pushes toward finding foreign law that is positive and
certain - a rule laid down as if by a precise legislature.
But the unsettled nature of a foreign polity's law governing a
particular issue (i.e., the relative indeterminacy of foreign law) is a
factor in determining whether it makes sense to use foreign law. In
Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,1 8 Justice Tobriner of
the California court purported to use a comparative impairment ap-
proach to resolve "true conflicts" (rather than Currie's forum pref-
erence) and then relied on California's relative lack of commitment
to its "key employee" rule to decide that California's interests would
not be impaired much, if any, by not applying its rule. The court
found this lack of commitment in the fact that no case squarely
recognized a "key employee" rule, no recent case even paid lip
service to such a rule, and, further, that the key employee rule was
a bad rule that no one ought to be committed to - the rule was
out of the "main stream" and "archaic." In other words, "Louis-
iana has a better rule, let's use it."
The Tobriner reasoning in Offshore is suggestive of an alternative
that has won both some judicial adherents and much criticism: Le-
flar's "Better Law Approach." Two articles 9 by Professor Robert
A. Leflar attempted "to focus upon the true reasons that underlie
choice-of-law adjudication: the basic choice-influencing considera-
tions that actually lead, or should lead, the courts to one result or
another .... ",20 His "choice-influencing considerations" are then
both descriptive of actual practice, i.e., what really influences courts
in choice of law, and prescriptive of ideal practice, i.e., what ought
to influence them. He then lists and discusses five factors, the most
interesting and controversial of which is "application of the better
rule of law."
18. 583 P.2d 72 (Cal. 1978).
19. Robert A. Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in Conflict of Laws, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54
CAL. L. REv. 1584 (1966) [hereinafter Leflar, Conflicts Laws].
20. Leflar, Conflicts Laws, supra note 19, at 1585.
1991]
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A number of courts have adopted Leflar's system. 2' After all,
his better-rule-of-law factor purports merely to recognize openly what
was done covertly:
21. Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453 (Ark. 1977); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d
831 (Iowa 1968); Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d
509 (Miss. 1968); Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966); Conklin v. Homer, 157 N.W.2d 579
(Wis. 1968). Several leading commentaries besides Leflar have advocated that consideration of the
quality of the laws a court is choosing among be a factor in the choice: RUSSEL T. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON Tm CONFLICT OF LAWS 328 (2nd ed. 1980); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts"
and the "Better Rule". Threat and Promise in Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847 (1967).
Although Professor David Cavers later recanted (and repented) any allegiance to a "better law" point
of view, DAVID F. CAvERS, Tim CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 9-10, 75-81 (1965), what he rejects is the
wholesale use of the "better law" approach, i.e. that a court when it has a choice ought always (or
even usually) simply to pick the better law. Nonetheless, if I read Cavers correctly, the quality of
the law of each candidate polity is relevant to choice of law if not dominant. Certainly Professor
Cavers earliest and probably most influential article written in 1933 resonates with consideration of
the quality of the law being chosen. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933) [hereinafter Cavers, A Critique]. Cavers' thesis was that the problem with
choice of law (and the soon to be published RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)) is that it
is jurisdiction selecting not law selecting. Listen to a passage:
Should enterprising publishing houses in state B be penalized in their extra-state business,
because of the anachronistic legislation of that commonwealth? The rhetorical nature of
these questions is evident. Obviously, on this hypothesis, the law of state A should be
applied, not because it is the lex domiciii or the lex loci contractus or because all contracts
should be sustained if a law can be found to turn the trick, but because its application
here so clearly produces an eminently sensible result.
Cavers, A Critique, supra, at 190.
Be that as it may, in the course of this evaluation, the courts opinion as to the desirability of
limitations upon the contractual capacity of infants and married women will inevitably enter. Any
effort to exclude it would operate only to distort the intellectual processes of adjudication. This factor
in the decision may, of course, render of consequence the choice of forum. Judges in state B or in
state C, having laws similar to B's, may not attach the same importance to the limitations on wifely
capacity that would be encountered in state A. Such differences are inevitable; it is important only
that they be frankly encountered. Today, as in the past, their influence may not appear on the surface
of opinions, but, if the uncertain course of decision characteristic of most conflicts problems is ev-
idential, such influence had not been wanting. Moreover, a recognition of the necessity for a thorough
understanding and appraisal of foreign law should tend to diminish the parochial "affectation of
superiority" which now leads the forum so frequently to reject foreign law.
The end-product of this process of analysis and evaluation would, of course, be the application to
the case at bar of a rule of law, derived either from the municipal law of the forum or that of some
foreign state if proof of the latter law were duly made. The choice of that law would not be the
result of the automatic operation of a rule or principle of selection but of a search for a just decision
in the principal case.
What consequence the adoption of either rule will have in a given case will depend not on the rule
but on the domestic law of the jurisdiction thereby selected. Until a specific case is considered in
which the rules work different results, any estimate of their operation must in a large measure be
conjectural.
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Everyone knows that this [a content-blind jurisdiction selection process] is not
what courts do, nor what they should do. Judges know from the beginning be-
tween which rules of law, and not just which states, they are choosing.2
The public-policy exception to lex loci as actually used by the
courts (not as originally formulated) is a kind of better-law rule;
23
the supplemental "rule of validation" for contracts is a kind of
better-law approach;24 the Second Restatement contains a kind of
better-law principle among its "Choice of Law Principles." Section
6(e) provides for consideration of "the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law." If the basic policy of tort law is to protect
(by compensation) against catastrophic loss, then as between two
rules section 6(e) pushes toward the one more readily providing for
compensation, which is thus the better rule from the standpoint of
the basic values of the tort system.
The reason the better-law factor is not more openly used is that
it appears to presage the death of choice of law. Since a state's own
law is, so far as its judges can control it, the best that law can be,
better law seems like naked forum preference, lex fori triumphant.
Moreover, picking the better rule seems too 'overtly like legislating,
something courts are not supposed to do especially in a modern
positivist democracy.
Two quick responses: a) the "better law" is not determined by
the subjective value choices of the judges, but rather by the discovery
of an "objective" "better rule" from sources extraneous to the
judges, in the time-honored, rule-of-law fashion; b) the better-law
factor is but one of several factors to be taken into account. In
many cases, either rule will be acceptable, and neither truly better,
in which case it will not be a factor at all. It might be added that
where a forum knows and likes its own rule, but knows the foreign
22. Leflar, Conflicts Law, supra note 19, at 1587 (alteration in original).
23. See Cavers, A Critique, supra note 21, at 183-84.
24. ALBERT ARMIN EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL § 54 (3rd ed. 1974):
The resulting Rule of Validation (lex validitatis) is in accord with the general principle,
prevailing in many other areas including the conflicts law of wills and trusts, that "if the
court has a reasonable choice ... between applicable systems of law, it should choose that
one that results in legal 'validation'." Corbin, Contracts § 548 n.9 (Supp. 1971) (in turn
citing the author).
Quoted in CRAITON, CONFLICT OF LAws, CASES-COMMENTS-QUEsTIONS, 162 (4th ed. 1987).
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law only through an old case or a dubious statute, which the courts
of the foreign state would probably overrule or ignore if they had
the forum case in their courts, 25 it makes sense for the forum to
apply its own law, unless it has no connection to the law suit except
that of being the forum of adjudication.
Several scholars have spawned what appear to be neo or quasi
lex loci theories of choice of law, a classificatory label to which they
would no doubt object. Some of these theorists are called "neo-
territorialist" and believe in "enlightened territorialism;" 26 others,
in the same vein, talk of "vestedness" or "political rights" of de-
fendants. 27 Whatever their name or aim, what these various theories
have in common is a reaction against the excesses and shortcomings
of interest analysis. I have catalogued above some of the shortcom-
ings of interest analysis: its too narrow view of the purpose of law
and laws, and its almost glib assumption that a polity's precise pur-
pose can be gleaned from the same sources from which a polity's
rules are gleaned. The neo-lex-loci theorists are, of course, also re-
acting against those two shortcomings of interest analysis, but they
are also reacting against another failing of interest analysis: its fail-
ure to take account, in a coherent fashion, of party expectations.
This failure coherently to take account of expectation involves both
undervaluing party expectations and misevaluating such expecta-
tions.
Each of the theories of the leading neo-lex-loci theorists28 is con-
cerned about the rights and expectations of defendants in civil law-
25. Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (1972), provides an example. An Ohio accident, Ohio
has a guest statute, Kentucky has none and there are significant Kentucky connections to the case.
Kentucky chose to apply its own law. Had it applied Ohio's guest statute, it would have been applying
a law that Ohio would declare unconstitutional two years later. Primes v. Tyler, 335 N.E.2d 373
(1974), aff'd, 331 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio 1975). Had Kentucky chosen to follow Ohio law it would have
led to the absurdity of Kentucky applying an Ohio law that Ohio would not have applied (even if
Ohio law applied) because Ohio would soon declare its guest statute such a bad law that it was no
law at all.
26. Aaron D. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers - The Pennsylvania
Method, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 373 (1971).
27. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DECISIONS (1991); Perry
Dane, Vested Rights "Vestedness, " and Choice of Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1191 (1987); Earl M. Maltz,
Visions of Fairness - The Relationship Between Jurisdiction and Choice- of-Law, 30 ARIZ. L. Rv.
751 (1988).
28. Professors Aaron Twerski, Perry Dane, and Lea Brilmayer.
[Vol. 94
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suits. Defendants are potentially the ones to be coerced by the state;
there ought to be, therefore, a special concern that an optimal proc-
ess fairness be afforded defendants. This sounds like the minimum-
contacts requirement of judicial jurisdiction. 29 Indeed, it is the same
impulse; Professor Brilmayer's political rights analysis is the min-
imum-contacts test enhanced to an optimal-contacts rule. It goes like
this: one has a "political right" (moral right) not to have a legal
duty imposed by some positive law unless one has sufficient contacts
with the polity imposing the duty that it is fair.3 0 What makes it
fair? The same factors that make the imposition of judicial juris-
diction fair make the imposition of law fair: general notice, reci-
procity, convenience, representation, and lack of contradictory
allegiance.3 General notice has been the most important of these
elements in jurisdiction cases.3 2 In the choice-of-law context, Pro-
fessors Twersky and Cavers emphasize the unfairness of unpre-
dictable impositions of law.3 3 Further, in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,34
and other Supreme Court due process cases in the choice-of-law
area, general notice is the dominant concern. 5
29. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); International Shoe Co.
v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
30. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989).
31. See James Audley McLaughlin, Territorial Due Process: Analysis of an Emergent Doctrine,
81 W. VA. L. REv. 355, 370-76 (1979).
32. Id. at 370-371; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985):
The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the
binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties,
or relations.' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319. By requiring that
individuals have 'fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction
of a foreign sovereign,' Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment), the Due Process Clause 'gives a degree of predictability to the legal system
that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit,' World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
33. David F. Cavers, Cipolla and Conflicts Justice, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 360, 366 (1971); Twerski, supra
note 26, at 382.
34. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
35. The application of an otherwise acceptable rule of law may result in unfairness to the
litigants if, in engaging in the activity which is the subject of the litigation, they could not
reasonably have anticipated that their actions would later be judged by this rule of law.
A choice-of-law decision that frustrates the justifiable expectations of the parties can be
fundamentally unfair. This desire to prevent unfair surprise to a litigant has been the central
concern in this Court's review of choice-of-law decisions under the Due Process Clause.
Allstate Insurance Company v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 327 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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The problem with heavily weighing general notice of the im-
position of a private legal duty is that few people rely heavily, if
at all, on the precise contours of private legal duty except when
engaging in behavior with obvious legal consequences such as trans-
ferring property or making contracts. In the torts arena, one relies
on one's moral sense, local custom, and posted rules. That is why
the restriction on ex post facto laws does not apply to the private
law arena of torts36 and why the common law follows the moral
sense of the community when not distorted by legal positivism or
conceptualism. In addition, the Dane and Brilmayer theories treat
all law as if it is public law controlling behavior and as if it is entirely
justice oriented. Interest analysis makes the opposite mistake of
treating all law as if it is entirely policy oriented. But the rules for
settling private disputes, for doing justice between private persons
with the state as neutral arbiter seeking that the private disputants
go on peacefully, are both backward-looking and forward-looking;
the rules are concerned with doing justice, with public welfare, and
with being done with the dispute.
The other problem with these defendant-oriented theories is less
connected with their being defendant-oriented (interest analysis is
too plaintiff-oriented) than with their being too abstract. Abstraction
of this sort sacrifices real sense to elegant reasoning and nice co-
herence. Lex loci gave us all the "nice coherence" we could ever
want. Nice coherence does not allow sufficient room for situation-
sense 7 - for the complex of facts and law that inform the sense
of justice in the individual case. Too much must be ignored as ir-
relevant which does not "feel" irrelevant. Elegantia juris leads to
new conceptualism. Rough coherence is all that can be hoped for,
or aimed for, given the match of our frail intellects with the com-
plexity of fact, language, and value that is justice under law. 8
36. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 386 (1798).
37. Situation-sense is a key word in Karl Llewellyn's explanation of how good courts decide
cases. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMAON LAW TRADION, DacmINO APPEALS 121-57, 200-12,
268-70 (1960).
38. All of this means that the ideal is not "certainty" at all, in any of the senses in which
that term is commonly applied to matters legal. The true ideal is reasonable regularity of
decision. If there is regularity there is continuity enough .... The reasonable aspect of
[Vol. 94
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Nonetheless, the new defendant-oriented theories are a welcome
antidote to interest analysis. It is not absurd to suggest that rights
analysis can be combined with policy analysis no matter how ve-
hemently each camp might protest.
2. Common Elements in the Modern Approaches
Among the new approaches that have actually been used by
courts, there is one overriding concern: to look at the whole problem
and to apply the law that makes the most sense given the whole
situation. To look at a conflicts case on the whole, the courts have
taken account of the interests of the law-declaring-polities, of the
parties to the dispute, and of the dispute-settling forum. In the Sec-
ond Restatement, seven factors are listed that account for these three
basic elements:39 polity interest is articulated as "(b) the relevant
policies of the forum" and "(c) the relevant policies of the other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the de-
termination of a particular issue"; party interests are recognized in
"(d) the protection of justified expectations" and "(f) certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result"; and the forum court's in-
terest, qua court, is represented in "(f) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result"; "(e) the basic policies underlying the partic-
ular field of law;" "(a) the needs of the interstate and international
systems," and "(g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied." Because a court's interest is in doing justice
under law in an efficient, accessible, and accepted way, it is inter-
ested in predictability and justice, simplicity and completeness.
Leflar's "Better Law Approach," which he would, no doubt,
prefer being called something else, has five basic factors which can
the regularity, on the other hand, holds out full room to adjust any complex of tension
to the hugely variant needs of whatever the relevant type-situations may be . . . . And if
the court is to do a job which is reckonable at all . . . then . . . the court needs to have
as tools at hand not a single one or even three, but well-nigh the whole Croesus-wealth of
our American authority techniques to choose from. Neat cabinetmaking is both easier, more
likely and more reckonable when the workbench is well-stocked.
Id. at 216-17.
39. RESTATEMNT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
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also be efficiently regrouped under the more intuitive "polities, par-
ties, and courts" suggested here. He accounts for party interests
with "predictability of results" and, to a lesser extent, with his fac-
tors of "maintenance of interstate and international order," "ad-
vancement of the forum's governmental interests" and "application
of the better rule of law." The polities' interests are accounted for
in "maintenance of interstate and international order" and "ad-
vancement of the forum's governmental interests" and "application
of the better rule of law." A court's own interests are accounted
for not only in "simplification of the judicial task," but also in
"predictability of results" and "application of the better rule of
law. "' 40
"Interest analysis" and "rights analysis," if combined, account
for a polity's and a party's interests but not a court's. But few if
any states ever adopted interest analysis straight up.
3. The Difficulty of Reaching a Consensual Approach
Why do there appear to be so many modern approaches, indeed,
almost as many as there are commentators? Although, as I have
suggested, all the approaches have common elements, they differ
because legal scholars and jurists differ about the formal aspects of
law and political theory. Some are positivists, some realists, some
neo-naturalists. Further, overlapping those general categories are
formalist/conceptualist and instrumentalist/functionalists. Theories
of political action vary from extreme majoritarian individualism to
civic republicanism.
41
40. Robert Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts of Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv.
267, 281-300 (1966).
41. A huge debate rages among political and legal scholars about what animates political and
legal action. For two recent, accessible and brief discussions of lawmaking and the nature of the
political state, see, Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 405 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving, 102 HARV.
L. Rav. 1695 (1989). My meaning for the terms here used is quite modest: majoritarian individualism
means the public good is determined solely by counting selfish individual preferences; civic repub-
licanism posits that there is a public good separate fr6m majoritarian preferences that resonates with
the moral nature of humankind and is discoverable through public dialogue and an ambiguous hi-
erarchy of public decisionmakers.
[Vol. 94
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With the above categories in mind then, it is not surprising to
find those who want choice-of-law to be a set of rules laid down
and others who, believing that rules for this area of law would be
either impossibly complex (and prolix) or impossibly simple (so vague
as to decide few cases), want only guidelines for analysis. 42 Some
see the politics that creates law as competing claims of justice, others
as competing claims of self-interest, others as both. If one believes
that law suits are the application of legal rules of behavior to discrete
past behavior to sort out liabilities, then one will likely focus on
finding the jurisdiction (or sovereign) whose legal rules are to be
applied. In other words, legal positivism leads to jurisdiction-se-
lecting-choice-of-law doctrine. On the other hand, if one believes
that lawsuits are the settlement of present disputes about past, pres-
ent, and future events and require the application of a myriad of
principles of justice, policies of social convenience, and positive rules
to reach a proper resolution of the dispute, then one will likely focus
on finding the particular law, principle, or policy that should apply
to each identified issue. Thus a realist or neo-naturalist will not select
jurisdictions (and ignore the jurisdiction's internal law until after
the jurisdiction is found), but will look at the myriad of principles,
positive rules, etc., pressing for application and consider as relevant
to the choice of law the source of each principle, rule, etc., and
source would include not only spatial location, but the location within
the hierarchy of democratic lawmakers. And whether the judge is
"making up or creating" the solution (the realist) or "discovering"
it (not mere logomachy, this distinction) she is not "jurisdiction
selecting" but "law selecting."
Lex loci was pure jurisdiction-selecting. The new approach is by
and large law-selecting, but some individual approaches are juris-
diction-selecting. Interest analysis must look at the content of the
law to determine the interest a state might have in having it applied
to the case, but it is little concerned about the hierarchial place of
its source (constitution, statute or case) and not at all concerned
42. See Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law Rules vs. Analysis: A More Workable Marriage Than
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about its content except as described above. Brilmayer's rights ap-
proach is also jurisdiction-selecting in much the same way content
may count in the determination as to whether "political rights" were
created, but not otherwise.
Finally, viewing a polity's interests varies with one's view of pol-
itics as (on a continum) from pure majoritarian self-interest aggre-
gations (pure power) to pure civic republicanism (pure reason). One
theory finds the public good in maximizing self-proclaimed interest
by majoritarian counting, while the other finds it in counting and
combining myriad (and countless) visions of the public good through
public debate and deliberation. One's assessment of a polity's "in-
terests" will vary as one's foundational view of politics varies. It
is therefore not surprising that there are various ways to assess a
state's interest and that the outcomes vary. The Curry approach is
rooted in liberal individualism; the "least impairment" approach43
is rooted in reasoned deliberation, as are the better law approaches,
including the Second Restatement.
Given the manifold ways of structuring law (by focusing upon
dispute resolution, politics or both) it is no surprise that the new
approach takes many forms. I will now look briefly at the underlying
structure of the modern approach.
B. A Composite Approach
1. Finding the Law That Makes Sense
It is no secret that talking about "finding the law that makes
sense" sounds like Karl Llewellyn and legal realism. 44 So be it. It
is also clear that "finding that law that makes sense" is no rule
43. For an excellent discussion of how the comparative impairment approach to interest analysis
varies from Curry-style interest analysis, see Note, Comparative Impairment Reformed: Rethinking
State Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 95 H~Av. L. Ra,. 1079 (1982).
44. See KARL LLEWELLYN, Ti COMMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING APPEALS (1960); WILLIAM
L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973). Llewellyn was not a conflicts-
of-laws theoretician, of course. His basic field of expertise was commercial law having been the original
Reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code project. But his emphasis in his jurisprudential writing
on law suits as dispute resolution is perhaps his greatest and most enduring contribution to American
jurisprudence. See KARL LLEWELLYN, TiE BRAMBLE BUSH (Oceana Publications, 1951) (1930).
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and hardly an approach. It is a first step, however, and it sets the
direction for the trek. "Makes sense" has a unique voice in choice
of law because it requires the court to look outward from the dis-
putes to gather two distinctive points of view, one of which occurs
only in this context. The judge must "make sense" from the point
of view of the polities that have an interest in supplying the law to
settle the dispute. Only choice-of-law cases require this. The judge
must also "make sense" from the point of view of the parties to
the dispute. Although making sense from the point of view of the
parties is not unique to choice of law, it does require an especially
intense look at the locus of events and parties when reckoning with
the expected expectations of the parties. In all this, the court should
not neglect to look inward at its own needs in order to be a just
dispute settler under law i.e., have the proper admixture of effi-
ciency, predictability, objective justice, sound social policy, and fi-
nality. 4
5
In judging a disputed choice-of-law claim, a judge ought to ask
him or herself the following questions: "What would each involved
state say about the application of its law to settle the disputed is-
sue?"; "What would each party say sans advice from a lawyer (un-
less a lawyer's advice played a part in the events and matter in
dispute) as to what his or her expectations of the applicable law
were (and, even, are) "What do I need in this case (and others like
it) to be an efficient, predictable court?" Of course, the final daunt-
ing question is "how do I put the three answers into one coherent
answer to the ultimate question: what law do I use in this case?"
2. The Point of View of Affected States
When the events of a dispute touch more than one state, a court
must determine which state polities would want their law to deter-
45. These five elements are simply the common sense listing of what a judge ought to aim for:
efficiency (act as quickly and economically as possible consistent with the task at hand); predictability
(both the procedures and the substantive law to be used ought to be accessible to the attorneys for
the parties); objective justice (the communities sense of justice as received by the judge in legislative
enactments and prior appellate decisions); sound public policy (the utilitarian side of probing for the
controlling purposes of law); finality (the dispute must be ended here authoritatively so that the parties
can get on with their lives and so that the community will have one less source of friction).
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mine all or some of the issues of the dispute. This "want" is bound
to be a function of the following: (1) the general purpose of the
law, (i.e., does it control primary behavior in order to protect police-
power interests-a public law purpose-or does it fix liability in
order to do justice-rectificatory justice, no doubt-as between the
parties-a private law purpose; (2) the legislative source of the law
(i.e., is it statutory or common law); (3) the clarity of the law (i.e.,
is there a form of words that can be authoritatively determined to
be the rule of law or is the reduction of the law to a rule problematic
or controversial); (4) the importance of the particular law to the
polity (i.e., is it central to the polity's jurisprudence or peripheral;
are there signs of recent commitment to the law?); (5) the nature
of the factual contacts with each state of the events of the case.
These contacts can range from a party's habitual or regular presence
in the polity to the location in the polity of the vital facts of the
dispute.
3. The Point of View of the Parties
The question here is both "what might the parties have actually
expected as to the applicable law before the events giving rise to
the dispute occurred?" and "what expectations as to applicable law
might they have had after those events?" The first kind of expec-
tation is a most important ingredient in fairness. Actual choices by
the parties turn on it. Before the event expectations give rise to the
equitable doctrine of estoppel and the moral imperative to be truth-
ful. Expectations can be further subdivided. Before-the-event ex-
pectations can be divided into expectations of specific reliance and
those of general reliance. An expectation of specific reliance is one
which the party can point to as the predication of a concrete choice
- the old "change-of-position-in-reliance-on" doctrine of estoppel.
An expectation of general reliance is the belief that a certain fact
exists (here, of course, the "fact" being the application of a par-
ticular state's law) which fact, with many other believed-to-exist facts,
forms the matrix of background facts that enter into the calculus
of choice but is not an expectation of fact that can be demonstrated
as a "but for" cause of a choice. In other words, an expectation
of general reliance is an expectation of the kind that is generally
[Vol. 94
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relied on in making choices but upon which no demonstrable reliance
can be shown in the particular case. In our world of uncertainty,
where choices are often made intuitively in whole or part, where
the calculus of choice (if such it can be termed) is often unconscious,
the honoring of general expectations about "states of affairs" is
important to a sense of well-being. This "honoring" by the state
is quite central to our notion of a just society; think of the pro-
scription of ex post facto laws and of laws impairing the obligations
of contract. Indeed, the procedural regularity guaranteeing the pre-
dictability of state coercion is what the late Lon Fuller called the
"inner morality" of law.46
The content of "general expectations" does not, however, in-
clude every state of affairs present at the time of an event that might
have been in the minds of the actors in the event. Only those states
of affairs that might "properly" affect a choice should count. For
example, consider an automobile driver in Indiana in 1990 who knows
Indiana has a guest statute. The driver carelessly drives his car into
a tree, gravely injuring his guest. The driver cannot claim "I might
have chosen to drive more carefully in a nonguest statute state."
Our response would be one of disbelief of the asserted fact (the
human psyche does not work that way!) and disavowal of the im-
morality of such a predication for choice (the human mind ought
not to choose that way). A general expectation needs to be both
credible and moral (or reasonable). What it does not need is de-
monstrability as the "but for" cause of a choice.
The expectations after the main events of a dispute are of lesser
importance than before-the-events expectations, but could be sig-
nificant; in some instances they could even be specifically relied on,
such as reliance on a particular statute of limitations. More likely
these after expectations will be those of the party and his or her
attorney. For example, an employee of a West Virginia coal com-
pany, who works at a Kentucky mining site while living in West
Virginia, might well expect the protection of West Virginia labor
laws designed to protect workers who an employer refuses to pay,
46. LON L. FULLER, Ti MOR.ALITY OF LAWv (1964).
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especially when he was hired in West Virginia for the Kentucky work
and his employer now refuses to pay him. The former employee
probably did not know about the West Virginia law prior to the
default in paying his earned wage (i.e., prior to the primary events
of the dispute), but only learned of the West Virginia law in ex-
ploring what he could do about the default in payment (from a
lawyer or otherwise). However, the belief that West Virginia law
would likely apply would play some part in the decision to sue in
West Virginia. Although, the decision as to where to sue would be
made ultimately by the attorney, the choosing of a West Virginia
attorney might well be influenced by the expectation that this was
a West Virginia legal dispute. Moreover, a party hires an attorney,
the attorney's decisions are the party's decisions, and therefore the
attorney's expectations count as a party's expectations.
How, and how much, to count the party's after expectation is
problematic, just as we earlier saw that after-acquired domicile is
problematic. 47 There is, naturally, fear of bootstrapping, of manip-
ulating the events after the facts to set up expectations to influence
the ultimate outcome of the dispute. But, as with after-acquired
domicile, careful sifting of the facts ought to uncover disingenuous
and manipulative claims of expectation. In any event, after expec-
tations probably ought not to count very much in the calculus of
choice of law and would be a fool's means of trying to manipulate
the outcome of a legal dispute.
4. The Point of View of the Court
The court deciding the case has some obvious interests: effi-
ciency, fairness of the process, justice of the resolution, and finality.
These judicial interests will push a court toward the familiar doctrine
or rule as against the unfamiliar, the tried and true, over the in-
novative, the mainstream over the avante garde, and the simple rule
over the more complex. These factors will push the court to use its
own procedures without having to classify a rule as either procedural
or substantive.
47. See James Audley McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The Choice of Law Lex Loci Doctrine,
The Beguiling Appeal of a Dead Tradition, Part One, 93 W. VA. L. Rv. 957 (1991).
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One's own procedures will be familiar and, in most instances,
will have no discernable effect on the resolution of the dispute. 41
Procedure is merely the way the ball is put into play but does not
determine its bounce. The more a rule goes beyond formalities, the
more polity and party interest will come into play. For example, a
statute of frauds problem is no mere formality no matter how the
statute is worded. Nor is a statute of limitations a mere formality.
But with regard to most "purely" procedural rules, including form
of action, proper parties, pleading, discovery, evidence, and en-
forcement, the forum judge can safely follow his own tried, true,
and familiar rules. Moreover, the parties expect to follow local rules
as to "procedures" so their after expectations are thereby protected.
Even as to issues traditionally thought to be purely substantive,
the court's interest in efficiency, fairness, justice, and finality can
play a decisive role in choice of law. When polity and party interests
appear evenly balanced between two or more states, then the judge
might properly pick the simpler, more conventional, and less archaic
rule, i.e., the more modern rule. In short, he can pick the "better
rule."
5. Combining the Points of View: Some Illustrations of
"Making Sense"
There is no formal way to combine the three points of view.
The proper combination depends on each particular situation. None-
theless, in most situations, the very notion that we are picking a
law from several candidate laws will cause us first to be concerned
with each lawmakers point of view. Choice of law presupposes legal
positivism; law is some sovereign's promulgated rule. It is natural
therefore to be concerned with each sovereign's will, in each polity's
interests first. The second consideration is the party's interests; it's
48. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), makes the useful suggestion that "outcome de-
terminative" as a test for substantive law (in the context there of causing a federal court not to apply
a rule of F.R.C.P. under the doctrine of Erie v. Thompkins) must mean so determinative of outcome
that it could well have influenced an attorney in her forum choice.
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their dispute. Finally, the court's own interests break ties in sub-
stantive situations. In procedural situations, the opposite ordering
takes place.
In order to see how this might play out in actual situations, let
us look at several cases from one jurisdiction. These are by no means
paradigmatic cases. They are, more or less, randomly chosen cases
used merely to illustrate choice-of-law analysis within the above sug-
gested framework - a framework for finding the law that it "makes
sense" to apply. Remember that in the real world of judging and
judicial opinions a simple intuition that it "makes sense" to apply
(say) the law of Ohio, rather than West Virginia to the issue of
interspousal tort immunity in this case, may be all that caused the
choice by the judge. In that event, the judge's corresponding ex-
planation for his or her choice may be no articulate explanation at
all but only a statement of his or her conclusion. Of course, lawyers
cannot, or at least ought not, rely on such judicial intuitions going
their client's way. They want to influence that choice. So the holistic
intuition, the grasping of all the variety of facts and values as one
whole picture, must be made linear and discursive. Not only all the
facts and values that create the whole picture, but also an expla-
nation of the various parts and what they together should mean is
necessary. In some of the following cases, the courts' explanations
seem purely intuitive. I have attempted to analyze the ingredients
of the intuition.
The first sample case is New v. Tac & C Energy, Inc. ,49 a law
suit over breach of an employment contract where extra damages
(more than mere loss of contract expectations) were sought under
a West Virginia "labor law." The labor was performed entirely in
Kentucky, but both the plaintiffs and the employer were West Vir-
ginia domiciliaries, the contract was made in West Virginia at the
employer's office, and the paychecks were made in West Virginia
and delivered in Kentucky. Moreover, the plaintiffs lived in West
Virginia during the duration of the contract, driving to work each
day from West Virginia to Kentucky.50 Thus the court's remark that
49. 355 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1987).
50. The Brief of Appellants, states that "Jimmie and Shirley New are residents of Mingo County,
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they were "only in Kentucky for the duration of the job" is some-
what misleading.5' That characterization of the facts sounds as if
the plaintiffs actually moved to Kentucky and lived there during the
two years of the contract. The fact that Jimmie and Shirley New
maintained their West Virginia residence and commuted to Kentucky
every day is a vital fact in the case.
How does one go about deciding whether West Virginia or Ken-
tucky law applies to this dispute. Start with each affected polity's
point of view. West Virginia has an interest in having its law apply
because the aggrieved parties were members of the West Virginia
community during all the pertinent times of the dispute. They had
a home in West Virginia, and their life outside of work was centered
in West Virginia.
It would seem especially important to West Virginia that its laws
designed to guarantee that earned wages and benefits be promptly
and fully paid be applied to a member of the West Virginia com-
munity. The wages provide for people presently living (eating, sleep-
ing, and buying necessities) and spending those wages in West
Virginia. These are not abstract "domiciliaries" temporarily living
and spending wages in another place. Moreover, the fact the em-
ployment contract was made and negotiated in West Virginia (in the
News' living room) gives West Virginia some interest in seeing that
its terms are adhered to. Any polity has some interest in faithful
adherence to promises solemnly made in the community it governs.
Promise keeping is part of the moral life of the community; promises
of wages for work are especially important to that moral life. Fur-
thermore, the promisor was an active member of the West Virginia
community. West Virginia certainly has an interest in seeing to it
West Virginia. They have been West Virginia residents all their lives." Because the concept of residency
is often used to mean the more technical domicile, the above quoted statement does not make entirely
clear that during the duration of the employment contract the News lived in West Virginia and
commuted daily to Kentucky. A telephone conversation with Mr. Bradley J. Pyles, the plaintiffs'
attorney and author of the brief, confirmed that the News did make a daily commute to Kentucky
from West Virginia. The West Virginia Supreme Court's statement of the facts does not make clear
that they understood that the News made a daily commute. A student note criticizing the result in
New assumed the News lived in Kentucky while working at the Kentucky mine site. Linda M. Gutsell,
Note, Conflict of Laws Resolution in Employment Contracts: The West Virginia Approach, 92 W.
VA. L. REv. 459, 482 (1990).
51. See Gutsell, supra note 50, at 482 n.122.
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that members of its community who make promises within the com-
munity adhere to them, especially promises of wages for work. A
state polity that provides for a civil penalty to deter such promise
breaking surely would want it applied to a promise made within the
state by a state domiciliary to another state domiciliary.
Kentucky also has an interest because the work for which the
wages (including benefits) were paid was performed in Kentucky. It
has an interest, as manifested in its laws, of seeing that wages are
faithfully paid for work done in Kentucky. However, since neither
the plaintiff nor the defendant is an active member of the com-
munity, except for the working day (not insignificant, of course),
Kentucky's interest in these wages and these promises is less than
the usual case and certainly much less than it would be if the wage
earner were living temporarily in the state and, therefore, a fulltime
(if temporary) member of the community.
On balance then, it would appear that West Virginia has at least
a slight edge in interest in having its law apply. That is a judgment
that feels somewhat subjective and one might honestly feel quite
ambivalent about it. The psychological dissonance might be resolved
by using a conceptualistic litmus test (one of the straws Cardozo
suggested judges grasp for) such as a place of making or place of
performance rule. I suggest two things for resolving the dissonance:
first, proceed with the analysis which requires looking at the party
and court points of view and second, if still uncertain or not entirely
certain, give it your best judgment and go on with it. Most of the
time, after careful analysis, a judge will be able to make a confident
choice. When he or she cannot, then either choice makes some sense
so you cannot be far wrong.
But let us go on to the parties point of view in the case. The
parties could have put a clause in the contract designating the law
controlling resolution of a breach. That is always helpful. They did
not. We must reconstruct what the parties probably thought (as
reasonable parties, natural parties, and ordinary people) about which
law would control the dispute. The News might well have had a
general expectation before the fact that they were protected by West
Virginia law since they were living in West Virginia and made the
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contract in West Virginia with West Virginians. But there is nothing
to indicate that they gave choice of law any thought, nor that they
had any idea what West Virginia labor law provided. The general
expectation of the employer might have been quite different, as an
employer would be aware of various Kentucky rules they had to
comply with in order to mine coal in Kentucky. Again there is noth-
ing to indicate that the employer actually knew about the particular
laws involved here or had given choice of law any thought.
However, after expectations are somewhat indicated by the News
hiring a West Virginia attorney and by that attorney's filing of a
law suit in West Virginia. That alone is a weak push in the direction
of West Virginia law. The employer must have known that if he
was going to be sued for its breach, it would likely be in West
Virginia. So there are some not very strong after expectations push-
ing in the direction of West Virginia law.
The point of view of the court interested in efficiency, fairness,
justice, and finality would add only slightly to the tilt toward West
Virginia. Indeed, the West Virginia trial judge in this case thought
that the most efficient, fair, just and final thing he could do was
to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction on the notion that he
had no authority to apply Kentucky law which he felt controlled
the case. Curiously, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
said nothing about the rather strange idea that subject matter ju-
risdiction is tied to choice of law.5 2 Ironically, the trial court's im-
plicit finding here is that for a West Virginia court to apply Kentucky
law is inefficient and perhaps unfair because, after all, only Ken-
tucky's Supreme Court knows exactly what Kentucky's law means
by dint of the fact that they have the final say as to what it means.
The same can be said for the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peal's reading of its labor law. There is then some push toward the
use of forum substantive law in every case. The more important the
substantive law is to a polity, the more it states deliberately legislated
52. The West Virginia Supreme Court blandly stated: "The circuit court granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over a wage dispute
arising in Kentucky." See New, 335 S.E.2d at 630. Surely the Court found something amiss with the
idea that choice of law issues are jurisdictional. It said nothing.
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public policy, then the more important it is that it be read and
applied by its own courts.
All in all then, it makes sense to apply West Virginia law to
New v. Tac & C Energy, Inc. It's a fairly close case. If one reads
the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts section 196 as creating a pre-
sumption in favor of the place of rendering the services, then the
presumption is rebutted - barely. If section 196, and other like
sections are merely suggestive, that is, if one starts with the place
of performance of the services of a service contract as only probably
decisive, but makes the significant relationship analysis with no pres-
umptions, then it is easy to pick West Virginia as the state with the
more significant relationship. Had the persons rendering the services
actually moved for the duration of the period to the state where
the services were to be rendered, the case becomes Very close in-
deed.53
For another example involving contracts, let's look at Lee v.
Saliga,54 another West Virginia case. In Lee, insurance was bought
and paid for in Pennsylvania, whose law does not require physical
contact with an uninsured motor vehicle of the "hit and run" va-
riety. Indeed, Pennsylvania had specifically held it to be against its
public policy for the private parties to agree in the insurance contract
to an actual physical "hit" before the run 5 West Virginia, by stat-
ute, requires a physical hit before the run in order to qualify for
uninsured motorists coverage.56 The accident at issue happened in
West Virginia as follows: the insured stopped precipitously when she
saw a car backing up at her on an off ramp on an interstate, causing
the car behind the insured to smash into the insured. The negligent
backer, of course, ran-no hit but a run anyway. Under West Vir-
ginia law there would be no recovery under the uninsured motorists
provision. Under Pennsylvania law there could be. Whose law should
apply? Pennsylvania has a statutorily announced policy that hitting
is not required. It is a fairly recent policy. It obviously stems from
the modern notion that catastrophic loss should be socialized not
53. The student note cited in note 50 above did assume such move and thought it quite sig-
nificant in faulting the Supreme Court for its choice of West Virginia law. Gutsell, supra note 50,
at 482.
54. 373 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1988).
55. In re Webb, 323 A.2d 737 (Pa. Super. 1974).
56. Lee v. Saliga, 373 S.E.2d at 347.
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only to protect the individual suffering the loss, but also to protect
his or her family and others in his or her support orbit. It is therefore
willing to risk some fraud on insurance companies and the attendant
higher costs of insurance.17
Would Pennsylvania want its policy to apply to this case? A
member of the Pennsylvania community, her dependent and, ap-
parently, two other Pennsylvanians will be the direct beneficiaries
of her protective policy. Moreover, the insurers sold the policy of
insurance in Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania, as a polity, is hostile
to such restrictions as physical contact on uninsured motorist cov-
erage. Of course, Pennsylvania would like its policy to apply to this
case.
What about West Virginia, would it want its policy to apply?
West Virginia policy is not to allow uninsured motorist coverage on
a non-hit-but-run negligent cause of an automobile mishap. It no
doubt believes such claims can be too easily fabricated, and the
resultant fraud is both unjust to the insurance company and the
premium-paying public; unjust in that the fraud increases premiums
thus diverting money from other uses in West Virginia. West Vir-
ginia's contact here is that the incident giving rise to the insurance
claim took place in West Virginia. Moreover, West Virginia is the
forum for settling the dispute. Insofar as West Virginian's hit-but-
run rule is based on protecting against the injustice of fraudulent
claims, it has some slight interest as a forum for the just resolution
of disputes to have its law apply. The fact that the dispute arose
in West Virginia adds little here because the real dispute is between
an insured and the insurer over the meaning and operation of a
clause in the contract. The West Virginia accident only triggered
that contract dispute. West Virginia's interest boils down to an ab-
stract interest in not allowing its courts to be used to create a risk
of perpetrating a fraud. The actual parties to the contract, the prem-
iums paid, the contract language used, have no effect in West Vir-
ginia. This is what the Currie interest analysis proponents would
call a "false conflict" case: Pennsylvania has an interest in having
57. Webb, 323 A.2d at 743.
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its law apply, West Virginia has none, therefore the apparent conflict
of laws is really false because only Pennsylvania has a legitimate
claim to have its law apply. Even with the broader notion of state
interest espoused here, it is clear that Pennsylvania has the much
stronger interest.
What of party expectations? No choice-of-law clause was put in
the contract, so perhaps the parties had no expectations with regard
to the controlling law. On the other hand, surely the Pennsylvania
insured, buying a policy of auto insurance in Pennsylvania from an
agent operating in Pennsylvania to protect against a risk centered
in her home state, would be in general reliance on the protection
of her home state laws. With regard to that insurance policy the
insured would believe that any rights created by the contract were
rights created by Pennsylvania law. The insurer would certainly have
the same general expectations as to duties under the policy sold in
Pennsylvania to a Pennsylvanian.
What of the court's interest? The Pennsylvania rule is easy to
find and, according to the Pennsylvania courts, other means than
requiring a physical collision ought to be used to protect insurance
companies against fraud.5 8 Therefore the court's interest in an ef-
ficient, fair resolution of the dispute is satisfied. All in all, Lee v.
Saliga is an easy case.
Another easy case is Paul v. National Life,5 9 a West Virginia
case on all fours with the seminal Babcock v. Jackson.60 The only
difference is that in the almost thirty years since Babcock, guest
statutes have become not "better," but rather "worse" law. 61
Here is what is nominally a dispute between the estates of two
friends and an insurance company over the financial consequences
58. Id. at 742.
59. Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (V. Va. 1986).
60. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
61. They are "worse law" in two senses: the steady trend has been away from guest statutes
and since 1973 at least thirteen guest statutes have been declared unconstitutional so that by the
objective measure of acceptance by American courts and legislatures, guest statutes are much worse
law than they were when Babcock v. Jackson was decided in 1963. Moreover, as between guest statutes
limitations and no such limits, the no limits rule is increasingly thought by courts to be the "better
rule," i.e. guest statutes are "worse law." See Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d at 552-53.
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of an accident in Indiana that killed both friends. The friends were
from West Virginia and travelling from West Virginia when the tragic
mishap occurred on an interstate highway in Indiana. Indiana is a
guest-statute state. The trial court, seeing no evidence of willful con-
duct in the discovery record and believing West Virginia to be true
to lex loci, dismissed the case.
Did Indiana have any interest in having its law apply to the case?
Indiana surely has an interest in having its rules of driver conduct
apply to anyone driving in Indiana. Are the rules of liability for
breach of driver-conduct rules part of the driver-conduct rules? They
would be if they imposed a sanction on the conduct but a guest
statute is the grant of a specific immunity from such sanction. If
this immunity was granted in order to encourage or permit conduct
that would otherwise be forbidden then the liability would be tied
to the conduct. But surely no one would attribute to Indiana a
purpose to encourage or permit hosts to be less careful with regard
to guest passengers than the usual standard of care required of all
drivers. Thus, the liability rule here (a guest statute immunity) is
completely detachable from the driver conduct rules. Why did In-
diana grant the immunity? The cynical answer is that legislators
wanted to protect liability insurance companies whose lobbyist took
them out to dinner and sweet-talked them. A more plausible, less
cynical, policy-type purpose is that the legislature wanted to protect
insurance premium payers from "friendly (or even collusive)" law
suits. A guest statute would be thus seen as a trade-off: lower prem-
iums for less protection from catastrophic loss. Only members of
the polity itself could be seen to make that tradeoff; it would be
politically unfair to apply it to nondomiciliaries; and, in any event,
Indiana would not intend its tradeoff policy to apply to nonmembers
of the Indiana community doing the "trading-off."
To this point Indiana can be seen as having no interest in ap-
plying its guest statute to a case where neither party is from Indiana
or has any ties to Indiana. What if the reason for the law is to
avoid the unfairness (separate from the expensiveness) of the friendly
or collusive lawsuits. After all, because little of the adverse effect
falls on the driver, the real defendant in a car wreck case is the
insurance company. In addition, some Indiana legislator might have
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been persuaded to pass or retain the guest statute because of the
felt injustice of a law suit against a friend kind enough to give her
friend a ride - a principled decision to disallow "biting the hand
that feeds you." Besides, one knows a host's driving habits and
rather assumes the risk (knowing what it is) of the driver's care-
lessness.
Do these justice or deontological62 reasons for a guest statute
give Indiana an interest in this case? The accident happened in In-
diana. A dispute arises as to the distribution of the costs of the
accidents. Indiana may have some slight interest in the just distri-
bution of the costs but since most of costs fall outside Indiana, it
has very little.
Does a polity have any interest in its version of justice being
applied on the sole basis that the main operative conduct occasioning
the dispute occurred within its boundaries? Such an abstract interest
in a dispute between members of a different community where the
resolution of the dispute will have no effect within the community
(either to deter conduct or to distribute costs) is that of the bystander
who, if he vigorously tries to impose his version of justice, will be
thought an officious intermeddler.
So far, Indiana has essentially no claim to apply its law. One
other reason has been proffered for guest statutes,63 this one based
on justice and policy (or utility); since the limits on liability of most
insurance often do not cover the full cost of many accidents, the
more innocent victims ought to have first claim on the pool of in-
surance available as between guest and third-party victims; the third-
party, having no knowledge of the driving personality of defendant-
insured, is the more innocent (a justice argument) and besides, the
third parties are more likely to be locals (a policy argument, weak
as it is). A guest statute is, to say the least, a crude tool for pro-
tecting third parties. Why not have a rule that simply awards them
62. "Deontological" was originally synonymous with "ethical" but is now used to mean tra-
ditional non-consequentialist ethics which creates specific behavior-focused obligations and rights as
contrasted to consequentialist (usually utilitarian) ethics.
63. See Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d at 795.
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priority? In any event, there is no third party in this case so that
reason is out. So even given the most generous reading of purposes
for guest statutes and interests in having them apply, Indiana can
not reasonably care about having its law apply here.
The West Virginia interest is so plain we will skip it and go to
the parties point of view. Obviously, neither the driver-host nor the
passenger-guest had any specific expectations about either law ap-
plying. What about the insurance company defendant? Did it rely
in charging premiums on a certain number of states (very few now)
having guests statues to be applied in West Virginia under lex loci
delicti for accidents in those guest-statute states? The burden would
certainly be on the insurance company to prove such reliance, 64 a
reliance few would think reasonable. Besides, it's quite plausible that
the guest victim generally relied on her friend being a responsible
person who carried insurance, such if her friend had a momentary
lapse and caused her injury she would be protected. She might be
quite surprised to learn that no recovery could be had because they
just happened to be in Indiana when the "lapse" occurred, which
just happens to have this strange immunity called a guest statute.
Expectations here would seem to favor applying West Virginia law.
Finally, we come to the court's own point of view. Applying
either law is a simple familiar task that can be done quite efficiently.
But justly is another matter. Guest statutes are troglodytes of the
law as was amply pointed out by Justice Neely in his opinion in
Paul. Many states have declared them unconstitutional. No state has
passed one recently and many states have repealed them. Guest sta-
tutes are, then, based on trends in legislation and judicial treatment,
objectively the "worse law," while ordinary negligence recovery for
guests is objectively the "better law."
All in all, it would not have made one iota of sense to apply
Indiana's guest statute to the Paul case. Had the new approach of
the Second Restatement been used (or any other new approach been
64. The kind of reliance referred to here is specific reliance, and it makes sense to require the
one claiming such reliance to prove it. Specific reliance is the strongest kind of party expectation for
choice of law purposes.
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used, including the composite approach suggested here) the trial court
would not have erred, and the whole appeal process could have been
avoided. The only uncertainty here was caused by the hollowness
of lex loci.
II. CONCLUSION: A LAWYER-DEPENDENT DOCTRINE
After careful analysis, the choice of law in most cases will be
clear. In those where it is not clear either choice will make sense.
In any event, the courts are dependent on the attorneys to develop
the facts and the significance of the facts on which the choice will
be made. If courts and lawyers would loosen up a bit, 6 and not
65. The late Thurman Arnold, one of the more iconoclastic of the legal realists (he wrote The
Folklore of Capitalism (1937) and The Symbols of Government (1935), but who, after a stint in
Academia as Dean at West Virginia University College of Law, Professor at Yale Law School, and
judge on the federal bench, founded the Washington law firm of Arnold, Fortas and Porter) waxed
poetic when it came to Conflict of Laws as dished up by Joseph Beale (at Harvard law school). In
Arnold's autobiography, Fair Fights and Foul, A Dissenting Lawyer's Life (1965), he remembers a
poem written at the Harvard Law School in 1914, to which I have added a second verse, hopefully
in something of the spirit of Arnold's original. Here is Arnold's doggerel with my addition:
CONFLICT OF LAWS
CONFLICT OF LAWS with its peppery seasoning,
Of pliable, scarcely reliable reasoning,
Dealing with weird and impossible things,
Such as marriage and domicil, bastards and kings,
All about courts without jurisdiction,
Handing out misery, pain and affliction,
Making defendant, for reasons confusing,
Unfounded, ill-grounded, but always amusing,
Liable one place but not in another,
Son of his father, but not of his mother,
Married in Sweden, but only a lover in
Pious dominions of Great Britain's sovereign.
Blithely upsetting all we've been taught,
Rendering futile our methods of thought,
Till Reason, tottering down from her throne,
And Common Sense, sitting, neglected, alone,
Cry out despairingly, "Why do you hate us?
Give us once more our legitimate status."
Ah, Students, bewildered, don't grasp at such straws,
But join in the chorus of Conflict of Laws.
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strain for certainty, they will get that "reasonable regularity" in
choice of law necessary to a sound system of private dispute res-
olution. I have suggested that courts use the Second Restatement as
an analytical tool to help achieve that reasonable regularity sup-
plemented by the idea, firmly fixed in mind, that the aim of the
process is to choose that law that it makes the most sense to use
under the circumstances of the case before the court - "sense"
Chorus
Beale, Beale, wonderful Beale,
Not even in verse can we tell how we feel,




For the law is a system of
wheels within wheels
Invented by Sayres and Thayers and Beales
With each little wheel
So exactly adjusted,
That if it goes haywire
The whole thing is busted.
So Hail to Profanity,
Goodbye to Sanity,
Lost if you stop to consider or pause.
On with the frantic, romantic, pedantic,
Effusive, abusive, illusive, conclusive,
Evasive, persuasive- Conflict of Laws.
THUmAN ARNOLD, FAIR Firs AND FouL 21-22 (1965).
Second Verse
If Arnold thought reason had gone from its throne
Clear back in '14, 0 now how he'd groan
For Babcock and Jackson had a terrible row
And seeds of new policy surely did sow.
The seeds were from plants nursed in academia's groves
And from '20 to '60 grew in great droves;
But, once out of the classroom and into the courts
The profuse little seedlings grew into sports.
Though the new growth was reason supplanting mere rites
When growing in Academe's neat little sites;
In real rows the neat rows fit nothing quite right,
And we often get darkness instead of new light.
But if light be our metaphor, mixed as it is,
Old light was dimmer and fuzzy as fizz;
Nothing it showed but shadow to fools
Who mistake simple outlines for the sureness of rules.
Now New light makes "sense" always the goal
And explores each case nuance with the Restated tools
So, Lawyers, relax, break up the old straws,
And join in the chorus of Conflict of Laws.
19911
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being informed by the points of view and sense of the polities, par-,
ties and the court.
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